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Beneath the Surface of Stability: New
and Old Modes of Governance in
European Industrial Relations
ABSTRACT ■ Despite surface stability, there are significant changes in the
modes of governance regulating the relationship between law and collective
bargaining as a source of labour rights, and between norms defined at EU,
national, sectoral and company level. This article focuses on the European
integration process as a key source of change, first outlining the weaknesses
of informal coordination of wage bargaining within and across countries, then
discussing the tensions for trade unions created by Economic and Monetary
Union. It concludes by examining the diffusion of ‘opening clauses’ in sectoral
agreements, the displacement of collective by individual rights promoted by
EU law and the reduction in statutory standards of welfare and social rights.
Introduction
It is almost a decade since Streeck insisted that European industrial
relations, although rapidly internationalizing, were not denationalizing.
‘Even as European integration accelerates, national politics and industrial
relations will, for better or worse, remain the principal arenas for the social
regulation of work and employment’ (Streeck, 1998). This was a fairly
good prediction. Many distributional and regulatory conflicts and issues
in today’s industrial relations are deeply influenced by the double process
of globalization and European integration, but the actors and institutions
of industrial relations (unions, employers’ associations, collective bargain-
ing and conflict resolution) are predominantly defined by national
traditions, law and power relations. This does not mean that they have not
changed: beneath a surface of stability there are significant changes in the
‘modes of governance’ of industrial relations institutions. I shall argue that
the European integration process is a key factor in these changes.
In his description of the objectives of the project coordinated by the
European University Institute on New Modes of Governance, Rhodes
(2005) usefully warns that innovations in governance are rarely path
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breaking, but nearly always a blending of ‘old’ and ‘new’; that it is not
always clear what is ‘old’ or ‘new’; and that the most fascinating puzzles
usually lie at the boundaries. Industrial relations in Europe, though
reflecting very different national traditions of self-regulation, law and
state intervention (Crouch, 1993), is a very good candidate for studying
this blending of old and new.
Governance is an overstretched concept, used in many different ways.
In the tradition of public administration and state theory, it is often
defined as regulation in which the responsibilities of private and public
actors are blurred; there is minimal recourse to law and public authority;
and policies are defined and implemented through bargaining and
networks (Kooiman, 1993; Stoker, 1998; Van Kersbergen and Van
Waarden, 2004). ‘New’ governance is understood as pushing such
arrangements further towards delegated self-regulation, through
persuasion, informal networks and norms, benchmarking and experi-
mental deliberation (Cohen and Sabel, 1997; EC, 2001; Joerges, 2002;
Zeitlin, 2005). While we see some of this in industrial relations, there is
perhaps a stronger opposite movement of increased use of individual
labour law and the replacement of self-regulation and ‘custom’ (possibly
the ‘oldest’ mode of governance in industrial relations) by mandatory
law. I shall argue that both trends (one away from collective rights and
conditions applied in a standardized way, either through law or by collec-
tive agreement; the other towards individual rights defined by law at the
expense of self-regulation) are related to the particular economic and legal
dynamics of the European integration process.
Informal Coordination and Wage Norms Under EMU
The realization of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in January
1999 and the enlargement of the European Union in May 2004 were the
two key European events of the past decade. It is perhaps too soon to
predict the effects of the latter on industrial relations, but about the EMU
effect we can be less reticent. There have been two broad responses. One
has been attempts at cross-border coordination among trade unions in
what can be described as the ‘D-mark zone’ (Germany, Austria, the
Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, France and, although not a member
of EMU, Denmark). In these countries, wage setting had already been
reorganized in the 1980s or early 1990s to allow wages to rise between a
floor defined by past inflation and a ceiling by labour productivity, thus
assuring convergence towards the non-inflationary German regime. The
institutional means to achieve this varied: pattern bargaining in
Austria and Germany, with export industries taking the lead; intra- and
inter-associational target-setting to guide increasingly decentralized
European Journal of Industrial Relations 11(3)
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bargaining in Denmark and the Netherlands; government imposition of
an international wage norm in Belgium; mandatory minimum wages in
France (and Luxembourg). With the approach of EMU in 1999, and with
wage determination already aligned to hard-currency constraints, trade
unions began to worry about the danger of downward wage competition
between countries with roughly similar levels of competitiveness, and
stepped up their efforts to coordinate wage policies.
The second response to the discipline imposed by the Maastricht Treaty
was a series of more or less successful social pacts and agreements in
‘catch-up’ countries outside the D-mark zone (Portugal, Italy and an
attempt in Greece) and those prospective EMU Member States that were
confronted with deep structural changes (Ireland and Finland). Since the
organizational and institutional preconditions for non-inflationary wage
determination were usually lacking, this required major reforms in most
countries. In some countries, this was achieved through central agree-
ments with or without government involvement (Italy, less dramatically
in Spain and unsuccessfully in Greece). In countries with decentralized,
firm-based wage determination (Ireland and Portugal) or with strong
rivalries between sectors (Finland), stability was achieved through the
negotiation and renewal of tripartite pacts defining a national wage ceiling.
Informal Wage Coordination at European Level
Coordination of wage bargaining in Europe had to be based entirely on
voluntary agreement among the trade unions. It had the support of the
European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC), some of its most
powerful national (Germany and Belgium) and industry (engineering)
affiliates, and received tacit backing from DG Employment and Social
Affairs within the Commission. European employers’ organizations
were neither able nor willing to engage in international collective bargain-
ing or joint coordination. The European Central Bank (ECB) and policy-
makers in the Commission concerned with macro-economic policy did
nothing to encourage coordination across countries, arguing that to keep
nominal wage increases consistent with the goal of price stability ‘wage
imitation effects’ should be avoided both within and across Member
States (Pichelmann, 2001: 354), ideally through decentralization of wage
determination. Trade unions faced a double problem: on the one hand,
the fear of ‘beggar-thy-neighbour’ competition in response to increased
international competition; on the other, the need to deter the ECB from
establishing its authority through a punitive interest rate policy (follow-
ing the example of the Bundesbank).
From the early 1990s, with the triple pressure of the internal market,
the recession following the collapse of the European Monetary System
and the Maastricht convergence criteria, national wage bargaining in
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metal-working became increasingly fraught as employers pointed to
lower settlements in adjacent countries. In response, the European Metal-
workers’ Federation (EMF) initiated an international strategy (Schulten,
2002) involving a system of information exchange followed by an
exchange of observers and the adoption of common minimum standards
on working hours (1996) and vocational training (2001). Since 1998 the
EMF has advocated the formula of ‘productivity increases plus the in-
flation rate’, and attempts to monitor national practice. Whether this
could ever work without some sanction at the European level or joint
regulation with employers must be doubted. The conclusion from within
the main sponsor, the German IG Metall, is that there is virtually no
awareness at national level of the coordination rules — these rules ‘rarely
affecting or influencing national collective bargaining policies’ (Schroeder
and Weinert, 2004: 210).
Other European Industry Federations have stepped up their European
coordination efforts, but despite some success in political lobbying have
achieved little in terms of cross-national coordination of wage bargain-
ing. Hopes for a common wage norm in the old D-mark zone, as
expressed in the ‘Doorn declaration’ of 1998 adopted by unions in
Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Germany and later France, have
been disappointed. According to Andrew Watt, senior economist at the
European Trade Union Institute, these coordination efforts rely on
similar soft mechanisms (mainly peer pressure) to the open method of
coordination in the EU and ‘suffer from the same limitations: they are
fine in good times, but when under pressure they exert little binding
power over trade unions concerned primarily with national priorities and
constraints’ (Watt, 2005: 15).
Disappointment surely applies to the one and only forum in which
trade unions, together with employers, can talk to the ECB, politicians
and officials framing European macro-economic policy: the ‘macro-
economic dialogue’, established in 1999 to create ‘to the greatest possible
extent, a mutually supportive interaction within EMU between wage
developments, fiscal policy and monetary policy’. The idea is that if wage
bargainers signal their willingness and capacity for moderate wage claims,
the ECB might convince itself to lower interest rates. This has some
support in theoretical and empirical studies modelling the current
European situation. For instance, Hancké and Soskice (2003) show that
under EMU, wage bargainers have fewer incentives to contribute to a low
inflation rate than when national policy-makers (including trade unions)
were trying to qualify for EMU membership, and that coordination
among key EMU Member States might contribute to greater price
stability. They propose a pattern-setting mechanism, led by German
wage increases and settlements in sectors exposed to international com-
petition. Wage coordination based on concerns for competitiveness and
European Journal of Industrial Relations 11(3)
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price stability would be a functional equivalent to structural reforms and
an alternative to the decentralization of wage determination proposed by
the ECB, which they consider neither feasible nor desirable.
Macro-economic dialogue involves a largely informal meeting twice
every year. The test came in 2000, after low interest rates at the launch of
the euro in 1999 and currency depreciation against the dollar, sterling and
yen had sustained robust growth, leading to lower unemployment.
Perhaps understandably the ECB began to raise interest rates, but less
wisely it continued to do so until mid-2001, almost a year after the inter-
national economic downturn had started. During the dialogue of mid-
2000 and again later that year, the unions tried to convince the bank that
inflationary pressures could be contained without monetary tightening,
pointing to the long duration of moderate wage agreements, especially in
Germany and Italy (Watt, 2005). They failed: the ECB raised interest
rates and continued to do so during the downturn.
Informal Coordination in the National Context
National (peak-level) wage coordination has not disappeared, but takes
less and less the form of a formal contract enforceable by law. In a trend
pioneered by the Dutch Wassenaar agreement of 1982, a looser type of
coordination relying on guidelines or targets and moral suasion substi-
tuted for formal centralization of wage bargaining, in circumstances when
economic, organizational and cultural trends have pushed firms and
unions towards decentralized wage bargaining (Calmfors et al., 2001).
The success of this substitution depends on many conditions, among
them the governance capacities within associations, the ability of their
leaders to gain each other’s trust and that of their members, the articu-
lation of a deepening of national or sectoral agendas and norms at the local
or firm level, and procedures of democratic legitimacy, for instance,
through the use of referendums (Baccaro, 2003; Traxler et al., 2001).
Moments of severe crisis and the need for adjustment have led govern-
ments, unions and employers to consider social pacts as a viable insti-
tutional solution to their national problems. Accounts of attempts to
conclude social pacts remind us of the utmost importance that actors
form a shared understanding of the situation (O’Donnell, 2001; Visser
and Hemerijck, 1997), otherwise their short-term interests will override
the potential longer-term benefits for the economy as a whole. However,
not all crises produce such common understanding, and when they do,
actors will not always be sufficiently moved towards compromise.
The most notorious case of failure to forge a social pact is Germany —
ironically, the country that seemed blessed with a wage-bargaining
system until recently the envy of many, but since, subject to increasing
stress. Scholars have argued that the unwillingness of the German unions
Visser: Beneath the Surface of Stability
291
03_visser_057212 (jk-t)  29/9/05  2:42 pm  Page 291
to make compromises in the negotiations of the Bündnis für Arbeit during
the first Schröder government (1998–2002) was related to their strong
power resources embodied in sectoral corporatist institutions (Siegel, 2005)
as well as to social insurance institutions that mitigated the costs of high
unemployment (Hassel, 2001). According to Streeck (2003), the recent
history of German industrial relations demonstrates the disadvantage of
combining a ‘weak state’ (in the German case, deriving from the ‘joint
decision traps’ of a federal system and the doctrine of Tarifautonomie in
matters of wage setting) and traditionally strong (or from a different
perspective, equally weak) interest organizations that have a lot to lose.
A history of social pacts and the perception that defection may bring
the risk of worse outcomes for oneself may produce a norm of cooper-
ation. The organizational and administrative centralization of wage
bargaining may be less important in achieving beneficial outcomes in
‘hard times’ than a cooperative mood and trust among the major players.
If actors, motivated by social responsibility, give greater weight to longer-
term interests rather than immediate (self-)interests, then even moder-
ately coordinated bargaining may yield socially beneficial outcomes.
Such cooperation norms may emerge from a particular history of mutual
learning, interaction and reputation building between actors with
conflicting interests.
But will such norms survive in times of adversity and help unions to
make and defend choices that go against their short-term interests? While
a cooperative orientation can produce good results within any bargain-
ing structure, in the face of protracted economic difficulties actors are
tempted to revert to less cooperative forms of behaviour in order to
protect their interests and to keep or win the consent of core constituen-
cies, which in systems with weak coordination can have serious negative
consequences for all. The erosion of the cooperative norm is especially
likely when previous interactions are perceived to have generated unequal
or unfair outcomes: perceived unfairness will lower the probability that
‘non-instrumental motivations will affect the decisions of disfavoured
social actors to comply with social norms’ (Knight, 2001: 364) and such
actors will revert to hard bargaining over short-term gains.
In many situations, the institutionalization of social pacts into a routine
policy of inflation-proof and productivity-oriented wage setting does not
reflect the ‘first’ choice of unions or employers, but rather their respec-
tive reactions to what is perceived as a credible threat or constraint by the
state or an external agent. In a thorough comparative analysis, Hassel
(2003) has shown that state intervention in wage determination has
hardly declined in recent times, in spite of all talk about deregulation and
liberalization. One reason may be the transition to EMU and the politi-
cal risks of continued high unemployment. Calmfors et al. (2001) specu-
late that of all the actors, governments have the most to fear from
European Journal of Industrial Relations 11(3)
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uncertainty and should be the ones most interested in social pacts.
Having lost other policy instruments, such as currency and interest rate
adjustments, they should want to avoid the risk of inflationary wage
increases occurring ‘by accident’, because the fiscal and employment
consequences are now much more difficult to handle. Wage restraint
through coordination with the central organizations of unions and
employers is preferable to the longer, less predictable and probably politi-
cally less rewarding path of structural reform. But as the German case
teaches us, even if social pacts were a government’s first choice, it may
lack the power to get others on board.
The role of the state, either as external enforcer or participant in the
negotiations, has been paramount in all recent cases in which social pacts
or national agreements were renewed (Ireland, Finland and the Nether-
lands). When governments are internally divided or tempted to follow a
neo-liberal strategy (Italy and Portugal) or too weak and hesitant
(Germany and Greece), attempts at pact building have failed.1 In short,
cooperation may not occur in the absence of an ‘external constraint’, such
as the Maastricht criteria in the case of Italy (Dyson and Featherstone,
1996; Ferrera and Gualmini, 2004), or a convincing ‘shadow of hierarchy’
(Scharpf, 1993) cast by the state.
The national strategy based on social pacts may have become less
valuable in the post-EMU context, since the motivation and incentive
structure for unions to endorse painful reforms has altered. However, if
lower levels of unionization and decentralizing tendencies in wage bargain-
ing increase the coordination costs for unions, state support will become
more important for them. But once wage determination is under control
and unions act ‘under the shadow of markets’ and the hierarchy of a central
bank, they may have little to offer, other than a threat to obstruct reforms.
Hancké and Rhodes (2005), referring to what they regard as the EMU-
related pacts of the 1990s, argue that if these succeed in adjusting the macro
and micro foundations for wage bargaining, then the external political and
problem-driven motivation for negotiating further pacts will diminish.2
Fiorito (2003) calls this the ‘paradox of corporatism’: its very success
undermines its attraction to governments and employers.
Social pacting may remain a valuable strategy for the new Member
States, especially if they seek membership in the EMU. They are soon
expected to join the second phase of the Exchange Rate Mechanism,
which makes exchange rate policies a matter of common concern (with
procedures for surveillance and coordination) and brings the Maastricht
convergence criteria into play. Although institutional tripartism is a
feature in most new Member States, these structures are extremely fragile
(except in Slovenia, which in this respect resembles Austria) and the
chances of meaningful social pacts of the type concluded in Ireland and
Italy during the 1990s are rather bleak.
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The Stresses of Low Inflation and Slow Productivity
Growth
To compensate for history and lack of mutual trust, the authors of the
Maastricht Treaty tried to shore up the credibility of the new currency
and the ECB by developing a set of very strict rules. The independent
governors of the ECB were charged with maintaining price stability,
which in March 2003 was specified as ‘close to but below 2 percent’, a
norm criticized by some economists as dangerously close to the
unknown territory of deflation. The weak business and employment
performance of the eurozone gives advocates of this position some
ammunition, although the European growth problem may be more the
outcome of tight fiscal policies, especially in economic downturns,
stupidly encouraged by the Stability and Growth Pact. As explained
above, the unions have been unable to deter the ECB’s governors from a
‘conservative’ monetary stance.
It is hard to see how high inflation can be a solution, but very low or
zero inflation may be a problem. Some inflation helps ‘to grease the
wheels of the labour market’ (Akerlof et al., 1996). Holden (2004)
explains how that might work, starting from the old problem, discussed
at length by Keynes, that workers will resist money wage reductions even
in the presence of very high rates of unemployment. Keynes had no real
explanation for this, referring to ‘social and historical forces’ (Skidelsky,
2003: 420); but in a unionized labour market in which most employees
have secure contracts, employment protection and wages set by collec-
tive agreement, there are obvious institutional reasons. In the eurozone,
70 percent of all employees are covered by collective bargaining, a rather
stable figure (EC, 2004); seven out of eight are on a standard open-ended
contract, even though the use of temporary contracts increased in the
1990s. If employers want to change wage rates, they must wait until the
next negotiations; if there is no agreement, in most countries the old
wages and most other previously agreed terms of employment continue
to apply, by force of law or custom (Blanpain, 1994). The existing
nominal wage is, therefore, the ‘fall-back’ option of the unions, the ‘pay-
off’ with which they walk away in case negotiations break down. Under
conditions of zero inflation and an appreciating currency, this unchanged
nominal wage may result in a decline in competitiveness, especially when
productivity growth is very low, as is the case in many European
countries. Some European Commission economists make exactly this
point, observing that nominal wage growth since 2001 has been very low
and that ‘actors in the wage bargaining process appear, in general, to have
taken on board the price stability objective set by the ECB’. Yet nominal
wage growth has been ‘rather invariant to the cyclical situation’ and ‘the
slowdown in labour productivity translated into greater increase of
European Journal of Industrial Relations 11(3)
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nominal unit labour costs in 2001, 2002, and 2003’ (Pichelmann et al.,
2004: 2).
Some inflation makes employment contracts, which are usually written
for one to three years, more flexible in real terms, because the real value
of wages erodes over time (unless there is automatic and full indexation
to price increases, but such clauses have become rare). It may therefore
be assumed that reducing inflation to zero will make open-ended and
union-regulated contracts less attractive to employers. For some, it may
be a reason to shift new jobs to fixed-term or temporary contracts,
allowing them unilaterally to cut nominal wages by not renewing the
contract and hiring cheaper replacements (within the limits set by statu-
tory minimum wages). It may be expected that enduring low inflation
and slow productivity growth will fuel employer demands for contrac-
tual flexibility, lower levels of employment protection, lower replacement
rates and lower minimum wages.
There are other means of adjustment, but they are not very attractive
to trade unions either. Reducing basic pay and introducing more flexible
components tied to individual or company performance does make
nominal earnings more flexible; and variable pay serves other purposes,
unrelated to inflation, and appears to have advanced in many industries
alongside company bargaining. Although variable pay currently applies
to many manual as well as white-collar workers, it usually covers only a
small proportion (less than 5–10 percent) of their total earnings. But if
the scope for nominal wage increases is extremely limited, unions will not
want a large part of a very small increase to be at management’s discre-
tion. They will fear that there will be nothing left to negotiate at sectoral
level, and that sectoral bargaining will lose its function when its wage-
regulation role is undermined. This fear will be greater if the workplace
institutions representing employees are fragile, beyond the control of the
union.
The low inflation and low productivity trap also motivates employers
to extend working hours or reorganize them to avoid higher pay for
overtime or unsocial hours. The main employers’ organizations in
countries with the highest labour costs and low inflation rates (Austria,
Belgium, France, Germany and the Netherlands) are now demanding a
return to the 40-hour week, which would reduce hourly wages without
changing weekly or monthly rates. It is not clear whether there is as much
resistance to a longer week or fewer holidays as to lower wages. There
are, however, several examples across Europe of workers and their local
representatives conceding longer or more flexible working hours in order
to avoid job losses: many so-called ‘local pacts’ and ‘company agree-
ments’ in Germany do exactly this, weakening the union-negotiated
industry norm of shorter hours.
Lengthening the working week or year without additional pay is the
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obverse of the union campaign which began more than 25 years ago for
the reduction of working hours without loss of pay. That was the first
European union campaign orchestrated by the ETUC and had the
support of most governments at the time as a response to rising un-
employment; it may now be dead, not because unemployment is lower,
but because the real wage increases and overtime earnings needed to
convince workers to buy more leisure are no longer there. Consequently,
unions now have a hard time mustering support for what was often
presented as an altruistic strategy. Shorter working hours may not have
fulfilled the job redistribution promise that unions expected; yet, it is
understandable that reversing the process in a time of high unemploy-
ment, even if motivated by direct appeals to keep jobs from moving to
cheaper places, is not a very appealing strategy for them.
Renewal or Erosion? Collective Bargaining Between EU
Law, Welfare State Retrenchment and ‘Opening’ Clauses
At first sight, national collective bargaining systems in Europe have
remained relatively stable since 1990 (EC, 2004; Schulten, 2005). The
three major changes were the move from intersectoral to sectoral bargain-
ing in Sweden in the early 1990s, the regulation of a two-tier bargaining
structure in Italy in 1993 and the establishment of collective bargaining
of any kind in the transition economies in central and eastern Europe.
Other countries have more or less muddled through with the basic struc-
tures of their national bargaining systems. But beyond the relative
stability of the formal bargaining institutions, there has been a gradual
transformation. In all countries where intersectoral or sectoral bargain-
ing still predominates, such as Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland,
Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain and Sweden, the
higher-level agreements have widened the scope for additional bargain-
ing at company level and have introduced ‘opening’ clauses that allow
firms to diverge from collectively agreed standards under certain
conditions.
A second change, perhaps even more fundamental, emanates directly
from the EU: a considerable expansion of individual labour law, mostly
in the form of regulations and directives which must be incorporated in
national law. In many countries, such as Ireland, the UK, Denmark and
Sweden, this has led to a shift away from collective agreements as the
dominant source of regulation, and from voluntary self-regulation to
formal rights enforced through the courts. What formerly took place
within the domain of interest-based bargaining between unions and
employers now takes place within the realm of individual rights-based
legislation (Sciarra, 2004).
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Outside Scandinavia, this process of institutional shrinkage of the
collective agreement as a source of regulation also reflects the decline in
the representativeness of trade unions. Where there are no unions,
workers cannot press their grievances as issues of rights based on equity
and fairness to be achieved through collective action and bargaining.
Instead, they must rely upon individual rights, including a right to repre-
sentation, upheld by the courts. However, this may further undermine
‘voluntary association’: the Danish unions, for instance, fear that EU law
undermines the scope to provide collective goods, thus destroying incen-
tives for union membership. Collective agreements in Denmark have no
erga omnes effect, cannot be extended and only bind those organizations
and their members that have voluntarily signed them. This conflicts with
EU law and has created a problem with the implementation of EU direc-
tives, in some cases resolved by special ‘incorporation agreements’ with
mandatory normative effects (for instance, in the case of the employee
information and consultation directive) extending to non-organized
employers. EU law also pushes towards formalization and juridification
of agreements. Informal or tacit agreements, defining customary practices
in a particular industry or firm, are difficult to interpret by third parties
(courts) and individual workers may not be fully aware of them.
A third development, seemingly in the opposite direction and related
to domestic pressures of welfare retrenchment, is the packaging of collec-
tive agreements with more qualitative and social issues. Whereas welfare
state reforms tend to tighten eligibility and lower the value or benefits
related to classical worker risks such as sickness, invalidity and unem-
ployment (Korpi and Palme, 2003), there is a compensating tendency in
collective bargaining to guarantee provisions above the legal minima to
workers in large and medium-sized firms (for early retirement, see
Ebbinghaus, 2002). This development has been documented for the
Netherlands (Trampusch, 2004), but is common in many other countries,
linked to ‘social plans’ providing job placement and ‘super-legal’ early
retirement and unemployment benefits in case of company restructuring.
There has been a rise in sectoral agreements setting up collective funds to
finance such social plans in Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands,
Denmark, Sweden and Finland. The growth of individual labour law in
matters of gender equality, leave and childcare rights has also fuelled a
spate of special agreements or clauses in collective agreements.
The packaging of sectoral collective agreements with qualitative issues
reinforces the tendency to redesign these agreements as a menu rather
than a norm, and favours the use of opening clauses. At the same time, it
is the source of conflicts between politics and self-regulation. Thus in the
Netherlands, the government has tried to prohibit super-legal benefits in
response to austerity measures, with little effect. In Germany, a similar
conflict over sickness benefits in 1995 ended in defeat for the government
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and rapid concessions from especially the larger employers. These
conflicts will not go away, but may lead to institutional responses safe-
guarding what is left of the autonomy of collective self-regulation, especi-
ally in countries where unions are strong enough to convince employers
to remain one step ahead of politicians and the law. In Denmark, for
instance, in the most recent central agreement setting the ‘qualitative
agenda’ for sectoral negotiations for 2004–06, the two key issues were the
introduction of a central fund to finance parental leave above the statu-
tory level and pay compensation in the event of unlawful strikes. The
most discussed aspect in the subsequent sectoral agreements was the
introduction of a ‘mousetrap’ clause, which allows the parties to reopen
negotiations if parliament adopts legislation that would change the basis
of the agreements. This escape was seen as necessary to secure these
agreements’ relatively long duration of three years and was clearly
intended as a warning to political actors. A similar approach is followed
in Sweden, where the new sectoral agreements for 2004–07 could be
reached only after the central organizations of employers and unions
signed a so-called ‘adjustment agreement’ guaranteeing financial benefits
and support for workers who lose their jobs — their first central agree-
ment in more than a decade. However, if the Swedish government decides
to introduce new sickness insurance rules or amend existing working-
time legislation, the signatories may declare the agreements null and void.
Opening clauses tend to upset the hierarchy between law and collec-
tive bargaining, between collective and individual rights, and between
unions and other types of employee representation. Collective agree-
ments in most European countries are binding contracts, a source of
‘hard’ law (the exceptions are Ireland and the UK, where they create
reciprocal, but voluntary commitments or ‘soft’ law). A collective
contract has mandatory normative effect, preventing any detrimental
derogation in individual contracts; it therefore serves as a parallel or
alternative source of protective employment legislation. The main excep-
tion is that departure to the employee’s disadvantage may be specifically
authorized in a collective agreement between the union(s) and the
employer(s). It is not enough for a works council to consent, and agree-
ments between management and works council do not usually have direct
legal effect, unless workers explicitly agree that their individual contracts
be changed.
This has not prevented legislators (for instance, in the Netherlands)
from delegating aspects of working-time regulation to works councils
when no unions are present. In Germany, although limited to a narrowly
prescribed range of issues and situations, works council agreements do
have direct legal effect and replace individual contracts. However, if such
agreements worsen contractually determined conditions, for instance by
exchanging lower wages for job guarantees, this is interpreted as an
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infringement of the principle of ‘most favourable treatment’ by the
Federal Labour Court.
EU Directives (on information and consultation, parental leave, part-
time employment, working time and atypical employment) may be
another source of such conflicts, especially when they provide for lower
standards than defined in national law. Employers sometimes invoke the
more lenient European standards in order to press for downward
revisions at home, as in recent conflicts over the revised EU working-
time directive in Austria and the Netherlands. By not enforcing the prin-
ciple of ‘most favourable treatment’ (or what in Italian legal practice is
called the clausola di non regresso), a general tendency towards more flex-
ibility may be promoted through European law (Sciarra, 2004).
Opening clauses go under a variety of names and are essentially of two
types. The first is the classical ‘hardship’ or ‘inability to pay’ clause,
providing for temporary derogation in peius from terms and working
conditions laid down in the collective agreement, when a plant or
company is in economic difficulties. Such departure to the employee’s
disadvantage is meant to be exceptional, and unions or works councils
typically demand some form of audit3 or codetermination right. It is in
the interest of negotiators to keep the use of such clauses narrowly
circumscribed, since frequent use worsens the quality of future agree-
ments. In the words of an Irish Labour Court judge, commenting on the
decline of voluntary agreements in his country: ‘if people were stuck with
agreements, they would take more care over constructing them’
(Dobbins, 2005). The conflicts over opening clauses which erupted in
Germany and France in the summer of 2004, involving international
firms such as Siemens, DaimlerChrysler and Bosch, were remarkable
because these were highly profitable firms. They wanted to rewrite the
contract with the unions in order to gain further concessions on working
hours, threatening relocation of investment and job losses if no deal was
reached. According to data from the Max Planck Institute, around half
of all large firms now have local pacts negotiated with works councils,
though not all of these can be classified as concession bargaining.
A second type of ‘opening clause’ has become more popular and
provides leeway for firms that cannot afford to meet the general standard,
especially small and medium-sized enterprises. These tend to favour
sectoral agreements, which save transaction costs and help avoid direct
confrontation with the unions, but often they cannot meet the sectoral
standard that large firms are willing to concede, particularly given the
packaging of collective agreements and the narrow scope for wage
growth discussed earlier. This may cause the breakup or erosion of
sectoral agreements, as smaller firms leave their associations or join rivals
that do not negotiate a multi-employer agreement. These tensions
became particularly virulent in post-unification Germany and have led to
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a lower rate of organization and coverage in various sectors.4 The ex-
ponential growth of opening clauses in recent years has been interpreted
as a form of re-institutionalization, preventing further disintegration of
sectoral agreements by admitting and re-regulating practices that were
formerly extralegal and beyond the control of sectoral organizations
(Streeck and Rehder, 2003). The number of German employees covered
by agreements with opening clauses increased to 6.6 million in 1999 and
affects currently 40 percent of the firms under the jurisdiction of IG
Metall.5 In the negotiations for 2004, German engineering employers
wanted a general ‘opening clause’ authorizing local managements and
works councils to deviate from sectoral norms, but IG Metall finally
gained the concession that they and the employers’ federation would
need to be informed and give their prior consent.
Such developments are not unique to Germany. An innovation in the
2004–06 sectoral agreements in Denmark is that local negotiators may
conclude agreements that deviate either above or below the standards
defined in the sectoral agreement; they must, however, inform the signa-
tories. This means more flexibility for firms, but local union representa-
tives may also have gained something, since deviations are allowed only
in enterprises which have union-elected employee representatives and
only by agreement. In the Netherlands, many agreements since 2000
contain à la carte provisions, allowing individual workers a choice
between hours and pay or between different working-hours arrange-
ments. A similar provision with regard to working hours is offered
through ‘delegation clauses’ in sectoral agreements in Austria and
Belgium. In successive steps, beginning in 1982, French governments
have allowed ‘derogation’ from the law, thus seeking more space for
company bargaining, especially over working hours. In the pluralistic
union landscape of France, this creates many problems, since any union
may sign a contract which binds all employees, including members of
rival unions. The absence of a peace clause in such contracts and the legal
definition of strike action as an individual right (unlike the definition of
strikes as collectively exercised rights in Scandinavia, Germany, Austria
and the Benelux countries) is a further complication, removing all hier-
archy between contracts at different levels. The new law on collective
bargaining of May 2004 did not change this and retains the principle that
any of the five recognized national unions may sign a binding agreement,
even if it represents a very small minority. But the law institutionalizes a
right of opposition to such agreements by unions that have a majority in
the latest works council elections: a provision intended to encourage
coalition formation among unions, for or against the agreement, and thus
giving them greater legitimacy, especially when they derogate from the
law (Moreau, 2005).
The same conflicts apply to laws allowing the extension of collective
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agreements to unorganized employers. The issues are everywhere the
same: the introduction of a general dispensation or opening clause in
collective agreements as a precondition for public recognition and exten-
sion, and the assignment of negotiation rights to non-union bodies. In
the Netherlands, the law remains unchanged, but under pressure from the
government, most collective agreements that qualify for extension
contain clauses which exempt new firms. In France, where extension
plays a very large role, especially in the setting of minimum wages and
conditions, employers have proposed new rules to allow more flexibility.
In the negotiation over the Agenda 2010 labour market reforms in
Germany, employers and the opposition parties demanded that sectoral
agreements should be legally required to contain ‘opening clauses’, but
this was successfully opposed by the unions. The Polish parliament,
however, gave in to employer pressure and adopted a revised Labour
Code with a statutory ‘hardship clause’. Accordingly, the signatories can
agree to suspend a collective agreement for up to three years if a company
faces financial problems. Hungary went in the opposite direction in 2002,
revoking a provision mandating non-union bodies to negotiate in the
absence of unions.
A decade ago, the OECD (1994) argued that extension stifles com-
petition in product and labour markets, and called upon governments to
discontinue this practice; but governments have ignored this advice. In
1997, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) defended extension on the
grounds that it was a linchpin of the European social model, as defined in
Treaty articles 2 and 3.6 The competition rules of the internal market do
not in the opinion of the EJC overrule this principle. Empirical research
in the Netherlands has found no evidence that extension exerts upward
pressure on wages (Freeman et al., 1994; Rojer, 2002); by supporting
sectoral bargaining, it may reduce both distributional conflict and labour
turnover. By assigning rights to outside organizations, sectoral agreements
may not only improve the incentive structure for long-term investment
(training and productivity), they may also promote flexibility and risk-
taking in the workplace. By defining some hard collective and individual
rights and placing these rights beyond the reach of local actors, they help
create the security and stability of expectation that serve as the bedrock
for trust and flexible adjustment at the local level.
This argument of ‘beneficial constraints’ set by external and legal limits
(Streeck, 1992) has never convinced those employers who are there for a
quick profit. This is well reflected in a recent Dutch survey of employer
opinion regarding the principle and practice of extension, which found
that a majority of employers appreciate that extension supports equal
contributions to joint funds for training and pensions, and guarantees
labour peace (Heijnen and Van Rij, 2003). However, a minority sees
advantage in a shift towards company-level bargaining or, better still, no
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collective bargaining. This group, mainly operating in low-cost sectors
(retail, restaurants, petrol stations, cleaning, work agencies and transport),
is large enough to generate persistent conflict over extension procedures,
and in recent years, many of them have ‘escaped’ from the obligations
arising from extended sectoral agreements by negotiating separate agree-
ments with minority unions, in some cases created for the purpose.
Paradoxically, employer-promoted innovations to sectoral agreements
are most easily achieved where unions have access to a fairly stable and
widespread system of workplace representation. The Danish case shows
that there may be a trade-off, with both sides winning something; though
even here, with high union membership, this puts much pressure on the
national unions since they must provide adequate services to local repre-
sentatives and redirect resources and staff from the centre. Where union
workplace representation is fragile, does not cover many smaller firms, is
not under the full control of national unions or has fallen victim to
competition between them, ‘the marriage of opposites’ (Tarantelli, 1986)
between centrally coordinated and locally decided wage policies threat-
ens to end in divorce.
In that case, trade unions will be reluctant to join the sirens of decen-
tralization. The predicament of the Italian unions is a case in point:
according to data from the Bank of Italy and the employers, many small
firms and most workers in the South are de facto excluded from a second
round of bargaining, as prescribed under the model inaugurated by the
Ciampi pact of 1993 (Rossi and Sestito, 2003). Annual wage drift in the
southern regions was estimated at 2.5 percent below the national average
between 1995 and 2001 (Casadio, 2002). Given that average real-wage
gains in these and subsequent years were very small, this means that they
have lost out in real terms. This is irrespective of the general opening
clauses offered with the contratti d’aria and patti territoriali, allowing
lower wages in exchange for subsidies and job incentives in disadvantaged
areas, again mostly in the South.
In Spain, to take another example, most collective agreements have a
so-called ‘drop-out’ clause for situations in which companies may disre-
gard the so-called ‘wage guarantee clause’, a kind of non-automatic price
indexation. The clause is the main reason why Spanish workers have been
able to maintain purchasing power in spite of very low negotiated
wage growth. Spanish employers, like the Italians, worried about low
productivity growth and the decline of their competitiveness in the
eurozone, advocate the overhaul of the two-tiered bargaining system. But
for Spanish unions, given their absence in small and medium-sized firms,
decentralization is no option. For the time being, ‘drop-out’ clauses
which allow firms not to pay the (full) difference between price increases
and the government’s (lower) target inflation rate may be a half way out
of this conflict.
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Conclusion
This article has shown that changes in industrial relations institutions are
not captured by organizational and structural data: we need to study
change in the modes of governance of these institutions. A distinction
between ‘old’ and ‘new’ modes is clearly insufficient as there has been a
blending of individual and collective rights, hard and soft law, self-
regulation and state action and concertation, creating a very complex and
hybrid form of regulation. Much of what has been described in this article
speaks for the vitality of collective bargaining as an institution, its capacity
for flexible solutions and adaptation to very different economic pressures
and legal models. The sectoral collective agreement is still the linchpin in
the continental European model of industrial relations, crucial for
employer and union organization, the provision of collective funds and
goods, and improving the stability and incentives for long-term invest-
ment and flexibility in the workplace. However, this linchpin is now
assailed from different sides and its survival may depend on partial self-
denial through the use of opening clauses, thus losing some of the quali-
ties of hard law and collective rights provided through self-regulation.
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NOTES
1 I am not sure where to place Belgium. After the failure of pact building in
the mid-1990s, there were five biennial central agreements within the
boundaries of a state-imposed international norm. In January 2005, when
the socialist unions rejected the draft agreement for 2005–06, the
government imposed the entire draft by law.
2 To explain the Irish case, with six successive tripartite central agreements,
they argue that the country lacks the micro foundations for company skill
policies and inflation-proof wage determination.
3 For instance, the Irish central agreement for 2003–05 (‘Sustaining Progress’)
allows payment above and below the general norm, but also provides for a
monitoring procedure which informs central actors of the reasons for such
deviations.
4 According to the Institute for Employment Research (IAB) in Nuremberg,
between 1995 and 2001 the proportion of employees covered by sectoral
agreements decreased from 73 to 63 percent in (former) West Germany and
from 56 to 44 percent in (former) East Germany. Single-employer
agreements cover 8 percent, while 17 percent of all employees work in firms
which voluntarily follow the sectoral agreement (IdW, 2004: 108).
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5 For recent figures on local and company agreements, see
http://www.boeckler.de/wsi/tarifarchiv
6 EJC-C-219/97 Mij. Drijvende Bokken v. Stichting Pensoenfonds voor
Vervoer- en Havenbedrijven.
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